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ABSTRACT
To ‘save’ the Virunga National Park, located in the east of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the European Commission (EC) 
allocates development aid to the paramilitary training of the park 
guards, their salaries, and mixed patrols of the guards together with 
the Congolese army. Moreover, the ‘development’ projects the EC 
supports around the park have militarising effects as they are based 
on a soft counter-insurgency approach to conservation and to address 
dynamics of violent conflict. This amounts to the ‘green militarisation’ 
of development aid. This article describes how a personalised network 
of policymakers within the EC renders militarised conservation-related 
violence and controversy around the Virunga park invisible, by framing 
contestations and violence in and around the park as solely caused by 
economic factors and motivations. Moreover, by ‘hiding’ the fact that 
the EC aid is used to fund armed conservation practices, policymakers 
circumvent political debate about the use of development funds for 
(para)military expenditures. While the existing literature focuses on 
the importance of securitised discourses to explain the militarisation 
of conservation, this article indicates that in addition, it is important 
to focus on these more mundane practices of securitisation within 
international organisations that ultimately fund the militarisation of 
conservation.
Introduction
The Congo Basin is, after the Amazon, the most vital forested area on our planet, spanning 
several countries located in Central Africa. For the European Commission (EC) the Congo 
Basin forms a main priority in its quest to protect biodiversity and it is therefore one of the 
largest providers of development funds designated to nature conservation in Central Africa. 
It is difficult to gain a comprehensive overview of all the aid the EC has allocated to biodi-
versity protection to specific protected areas in Central Africa as it through different financial 
instruments. For example, the regional ECOFAC (Conservation et Utilisation Rationnelle des 
Ecosystèmes Forestiers d’Afrique Centrale) programme alone distributed 200 million euro 
between 1992 and 2014 to 11 protected areas in the region. Moreover, the EC is the strategic 
and main financial partner of many public–private partnerships (PPPs) between international 
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non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and respective government institutions. Examples 
are the Zakouma National Park in Chad, Garamba National Park in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (DRC), and Odzala-Kokoua National Park in the Republic of Congo. Yet, despite 
the significant support of the EC in Central Africa, it is a relatively invisible actor in the liter-
ature on politics of conservation, compared to other large aid donors and international 
conservation NGOs, which are increasingly scrutinised in debate on global environmental 
governance.1
Particularly in the Virunga National Park, located in the war-torn eastern region of the 
DRC, the EC has played an important role, estimating that between 1988 and 2015 it provided 
over 30 million euro in total to the park.2 Most recently, the EC is the instigator and main 
financial supporter of the PPP between the Congolese state institution l’Insitut Congolais 
pour la Conservation de la Nature (ICCN) and the Virunga Foundation, a British NGO that is 
now solely responsible for the management of the park. This article describes how the EC 
became the main institutional partner of the Virunga Foundation and how through this PPP 
construction it became possible for the EC to (in)directly fund militarised practices of con-
servation, such as the training of the paramilitary park guards, and the topping up of their 
salaries. Moreover, the aid is used for joint military operations of the park guards and the 
Congolese army, Les Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC). Lunstrum 
defines the amalgamation of these practices as ‘green militarization’: ‘the use of military and 
paramilitary (military-like) actors, techniques, technologies, and partnerships in the pursuit 
of conservation’.3 Other research indicates how this militarised approach to the Virunga park 
exacerbated instead of diminished conflict between the park and the adjacent population.4 
Focusing on how green militarisation is financed, this article aims to analyse how the EC 
managed to allocate development aid budgets to armed conservation efforts, and through 
which practices it was able continue this support, despite controversies around the milita-
risation of development aid, and the effects of this support on dynamics of conflict.
In the existing literature on green militarisation there is an extensive focus on securitisa-
tion, specifically the use of discourses of exceptionalism and ‘crisis’, and more broadly how 
the use of violence in conservation is legitimised.5 As Massé and Lunstrum argue, the ‘mili-
tarization of conservation practice is driven and rationalized by discourses of war and 
national/regional security that transform poaching from a conservation into a security issue’.6 
The literature stresses that this is by no means ‘new’, and can be traced back to the colonial 
period when the first protected areas were established in sub-Sahara Africa.7 A significant 
part of this literature is grounded in the linguistic tradition and not in the so-called ‘practice 
turn’ in securitisation theory, which would provide additional insights into the more mundane 
practices of the securitisation of conservation issues.8 I together with Judith Verweijen have 
argued elsewhere that also in the case of the Virunga park securitised narratives and other 
discursive techniques form an important element in the normalisation and legitimatisation 
of armed conservation efforts in eastern DRC.9 Yet to understand how green militarisation 
is financed it is equally important to focus on everyday practices of securitisation that remain 
more ‘invisible’, such as bureaucratic procedures, and the role of experts and networks, that 
ultimately contribute to this militarisation. This article identifies various of these practices 
through which policymakers within the EC are able to circumvent political debate about the 
use of development aid for military purposes, and ‘play’ with existing ambiguities within the 
financial regulations of EC development funds. This offers the EC the possibility not only to 
finance the salaries and activities of the paramilitary park guards, but also to support 
THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY  3
development projects around the park which, following a soft counter-insurgency logic, 
have a profound militarising effect on the wider Virunga area. Both ‘types’ of support con-
stitute the green militarisation of development aid.
This article is based on multi-level field research conducted between 2013 and 2015 in 
and around the Virunga park and in Brussels. In total, 13 interviews were conducted with EC 
officials and consultants in Brussels and Goma; the respondents were selected due to their 
former or current involvement in EU policy towards the Virunga park. Through these inter-
views I was able to reconstruct the history and evolution of the relationship between the 
EC and the management of the Virunga Foundation. I also visited and observed numerous 
events about the Virunga park organised in Brussels. In addition, I conducted a textual anal-
ysis of relevant EC policy documents.  Moreover, I conducted in total 245 interviews with 
residents, park authorities, employees of the Virunga Foundation, local environmental NGOs, 
administrators and politicians in 13 villages in and around the park.
The article proceeds as follows. First, the intersecting literature on green militarisation, 
the politics of development and securitisation is discussed. Second, I outline the history of 
the European Commission vis-á-vis the Virunga National Park, and how the institutional and 
political support of the EC contributed to the militarisation of the park management. I also 
discuss how a personalised network of EC policy officials renders it ‘invisible’ that EC devel-
opment aid is in practice used to contribute to the militarisation of the Virunga park. Third, 
I identify various ‘local’ contestations concerning the way the park is managed, and how the 
EC reacts to and reports on these conflicts. I conclude by arguing that through these more 
mundane practices of securitisation policy officials within the EC are able to circumvent 
political debate, and strict financial regulations within the EU, about the use of development 
aid to fund green militarisation.
The politics of aid, securitisation and green militarisation
The burgeoning literature on the effects of ‘green militarisation’ indicates that there is often 
a (re)production of violence in and around protected areas, while acknowledging that the 
use of violence and the militarisation of protected areas has been associated with nature 
conservation practices over a longer period of time.10 Examples are violent (dis)possessions, 
coercive policing practices and enforcing of boundaries of protected areas, marginalisation 
of adjacent populations, and more symbolic forms of violence embedded in the institutions 
and daily practices of the management of protected areas.11 It is also referred to as ‘green 
violence’ by Büscher and Ramutsindela: ‘the deployment of violent instruments and tactics 
towards the protection of nature and various ideas and aspirations related to nature con-
servation’.12 Various studies that focused specifically on EC-supported conservation projects 
also indicated various instances of ‘green violence’.13 While there is an increasing body of 
literature on conservation policymaking at multiple scales, focussing mainly on the role of 
the private sector and large international NGOs,14 there are not many studies conducted on 
the bureaucracies of development aid donors, and how they understand and report on the 
violence generated through conservation.15 Others have indicated these forms of violence 
often remain artificially separated from decisions made by international donor organisations 
supporting protected areas.16 Yet the politics behind this artificial separation demands fur-
ther scrutiny.
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Within the existing literature on the transnational politics behind the intensification of 
green militarisation, the focus has been predominantly on three different aspects; first, the 
politics of transfrontier nature conservation that is inherently linked to ideas of national and 
regional security;17 second, a mounting focus on the role of new media and transnational 
social activism, especially in relation to the ‘rhino crisis’, which generated popular narratives 
on green militarisation, especially in mainstream media outlets;18 and, third, the intensifica-
tion of securitised narratives promoting the militarisation of nature conservation in reaction 
to poaching crises, wildlife crime and ‘nature under siege’, and how these narratives influence 
NGOs and donor governments.19 Yet the literature on the securitisation of conservation 
issues goes beyond ‘green militarisation’. From the colonial era to the postcolonial,  conser-
vation-induced violence has been legitimised and normalised by colonial troops, and 
through declaring ‘states of emergency’.20 There is also a broader literature focusing on the 
influence of ‘environmental crisis narratives’ to explain the furthering of (external) protec-
tionist measures.21
Most recently the ‘terrorists-as-poachers’ narrative, claiming that poaching forms a lifeline 
for insurgent and rebel groups, seems to propel the securitisation of conservation efforts 
even further.22 Duffy described how this narrative emerged through a report written by 
Andrea Crosta of the Elephant Action League (EAL), an NGO working on combating wildlife 
crime, and Nir Kalron of Maisha Consulting group, an Israeli company that sells security 
services to wildlife departments and conservation NGOs especially in Central Africa and 
other difficult ‘war zones’.23 Yet the claims of Kalron and Crosta have repeatedly been ques-
tioned and no additional proof has surfaced since.24 Duffy argues that this narrative leads 
to ‘war, through conservation’ as militarised conservation interventions overlap with 
American geopolitical interests in its ‘war on terror’.25 However, besides the USA, the EC also 
plays an important role in financing green militarisation in the region. It is, for example, the 
EC that finances the management bodies of the N’Djida National Park in Cameroon, Garamba 
National Park in the DRC and the government of Gabon, who all solicited the services of 
Maisha Consulting.
While the financial linkages are often indirect, there are direct personal linkages between 
the EC and Maisha Consulting. In 2015 the EU published its strategy to address wildlife crime 
in Africa: Larger than Elephants, written by a network of connected individuals who worked 
together intensively over many years across different protected areas. Among the contrib-
utors, both Kalron and Crosta are listed.26 In addition, Kalron gave a presentation at an EC 
conference on wildlife crime in Africa based on the slogan ‘help nature fight fire, with fire’, a 
message that was welcomed by various EC policy officials as they associated this with the 
approach the EC supports in many protected areas in Central Africa. However, during inter-
views various EC officials argued that they pay lip service to the ‘poacher-as-terrorist’ narrative 
to gain political support internally within the EU for nature conservation, often a low political 
priority – especially since the Directorate General for Development Cooperation (DG DEVCO) 
has to collaborate with the European External Action Service (EEAS), the ‘new’ EU foreign 
affairs service, which initially was not very concerned with issues of wildlife crime. Thus, by 
linking the issue to security and stability concerns DEVCO officials aim to ensure internal 
institutional support for the practices they have been funding and supporting for many 
years. This underlines the importance of looking at daily practices of securitisation within 
bureaucratic institutions that enable the use of development to finance green militarisation, 
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in addition to a critical analysis of securitised narratives that are at times also employed 
strategically.
In a recent critique of the concept of ‘green militarisation’ it was argued that the existing 
literature does not distinguish discourses from the actual reality, and argues to analyse how 
much money and resources are actually deployed to a stated problem, in their case the 
‘Rhino crisis’ in South Africa.27 While it is indeed important to go beyond the militarisation 
‘on the ground’ and to focus on the wider resources, practices and politics involved, this is 
not an argument against the concept of green militarisation but instead an argument to 
approach the concept in a way that is more context and place specific. While the concept 
bears clear connotations to ‘the military’, especially in the context of South Africa, the mili-
tarisation of conservation (similar to the militarisation of society or development, as analysed 
by other scholars) is about a focus on processes of militarisation that are ‘constituted in large 
part by the activities of people in everyday settings’ which ‘work to make militarism a taken-
for-granted, or “natural” facet of many societies’.28 As Verweijen indicates, in the east of the 
DRC civilian space and social relations have been militarised where a whole range of different 
actors have incorporated further military objectives, practices and structures.29 It is in this 
militarised context that the EC is allocating development aid to the management of the 
Virunga National Park; how this support contributes to the militarisation of conservation is 
discussed in the next part of the article. Moreover, because conservation in the DRC has 
been militarised since the colonial period, and the involvement of transnational actors herein 
has a long lineage, it is important to focus on historical continuities that influence the con-
temporary politics behind contemporary green militarisation.30
In this article I focus on how and why the EC continues to support green militarisation in 
Virunga despite the negative effects. I do this by focussing on processes of securitisation, 
which ‘certainly bears an important relationship to militarization, but it allows for a broader 
range of actors and arenas, as it does not limit the scholar to exclusively consideration of 
the formal military institution’.31 For example, while policy narratives on wildlife protection 
become increasingly securitised, mainly to gain political relevancy and attention at the global 
stage, development aid distributed to green militarisation is often purposefully kept off the 
political radar, as are the (violent) conflicts that such aid can exacerbate in the areas of inter-
vention.32 These everyday practices of ‘hiding’ also contribute to a process of securitisation 
that enables the green militarisation of development aid.
To analyse these more mundane securitisation practices, the methodologies advanced 
by the anthropology of development literature and studies of securitisation are comple-
mentary despite often focussing on distinct groups of actors, interests and institutions. Both 
literatures stress the need for empirical research on the transnational field of development 
actors or that of ‘security professionals’, stressing that there are complex interactions between 
legitimising discourses and policies and practices. As Mosse reminds us, policy discourses 
and political discourses of development interventions are often constructed in hindsight to 
represent a comprehensive account of a development project, and to offer the needed 
legitimacy for the continuation of already existing practices and conducted expenditures.33 
This especially relates to the ‘practice turn’ in securitisation theory that goes beyond the 
importance of speech acts and clearly identifiable securitising actors, which was traditionally 
the scope of the Copenhagen school.34
The practice turn in securitisation theory, building in part on Bourdieu’s theory of practice, 
stresses the need to go beyond the focus on ‘exceptionalist’ discourses and to focus more 
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on everyday acts that facilitate securitisation in practice.35 As Bigo stresses, certain problems 
can be securitised without speech or other forms of discourse, but through practical actions 
such as discipline and ‘expertise’.36 Referring to Bourdieu’s notion of the ‘habitus’ of people, 
meaning their ‘embodied historical experiences’ that contribute to their dispositions and 
strategies, within a specific ‘field’ where power relations are hierarchised.37 Léonard argues 
that in the case of the EU security logics are often not so much expressed in discourse, but 
are institutionalised in policies and seemingly technical responses due to the unique political 
character of the EU as a supra-national institute.38 The existing literature does not give a 
clear definition of what securitising practices or tools are because they need to be empirically 
identified per field or subject through, for example, interviews with concerned experts and 
policymakers.39 This focus on the diffuse politics, and thus going beyond the discourses in 
policy documents, overlaps with politics of development literature that focuses on how 
problems and contestations are rendered technical, or depoliticised.40 ‘Experts’ play an impor-
tant role in the process of depoliticisation, through producing authoritative knowledge 
claims, while leaving wider structures of power and inequality unaddressed.41 In the follow-
ing I indicate how the EC contributed to the militarisation of the Virunga park, through 
supporting both hard and soft counter-insurgency approaches to conservation.
European Commission development aid and ‘green militarisation’ in Virunga
The EC started to support the Virunga park in 1988, but officially halted this support in 1992 
due to concerns over the legitimacy of the Mobutu regime. In 1994, thousands of Rwandan 
refugees and people responsible for the genocide crossed into the DRC and took up resi-
dence around the borders of the park. A small group of EC officials, afraid that these pressures 
would destroy the park completely, arranged funding for a Belgian NGO, Nature+, to work 
with the Congolese state authorities and other environmental NGOs in the region. After the 
First (1996–1997) and Second (1998–2003) Congo Wars, which ended with the adoption of 
a peace accord in 2003, official development cooperation between the EC and the DRC 
government was resumed. The EC re-opened a field office in Goma, the provincial capital of 
North Kivu, and hired a consultant to coordinate, monitor and evaluate EC projects in the 
region. Until 2005 this consultant was Emmanuel de Merode, a Belgian national.
During the same period that de Merode worked for the EC, the latter started negotiations 
with the Congolese government and the ICCN to establish a PPP with the British NGO African 
Conservation Fund (ACF), which later changed its name to the Virunga Foundation. In 2005 
the first PPP was signed, and was set up to manage the funds for the Virunga park, and to 
prepare for a ‘full’ PPP for 2010. The most recently negotiated PPP runs until 2040. Recalling 
this process, one EC official argues,
no, it was not a condition we imposed, the Congolese government was free to choose. But we 
said to the government, if you want us [the EC] to continue financing Virunga, we are only willing 
to do so when you sign a PPP with ACF.42
Concluding these negotiations in 2005, de Merode stopped working for the EC and 
co-founded ACF/Virunga Foundation. The NGO was registered in the UK to be eligible to 
receive EC development funds, which continues to be their main institutional financial sup-
porter.43 Many other international NGOs working on environmental protection in the DRC 
were, and continue to be, perplexed by the lack of transparency during this process, and the 
privileged treatment the Virunga Foundation received from the EC.44 One of the first projects 
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financed with the EC aid was the training of a paramilitary elite anti-poaching unit executed 
by a private security company in 2006.45
Moreover, the tragic killing of seven mountain gorillas in the Virunga park in 2007 influ-
enced the on-going negotiations for the ‘full’ PPP in 2010. As the director of the park at that 
time was allegedly implicated in the killings, this confirmed the belief of the EC that the 
Congolese state agency ICCN is incapable and lacks the political will to protect its wildlife. 
After considerable external pressure, in 2008 de Merode was appointed as the director of 
the park by the Congolese government and started to wear two hats, that of the ICCN director 
of the park, and that of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Virunga Foundation. Convinced 
that the law enforcement capacity of the park management needed to be enforced de 
Merode commenced with the ‘Security Sector Reform’ of the park, which was completely 
financed with EC development aid. About this support an EC policy document states,
In 2008, the European Union commenced a five years multi-sectoral approach supporting ICCN, 
the Congolese Protected Area Authority to address these problems … A wide-reaching reform 
programme and institutional support for the Protected Area Authority to enable park rangers 
to more effectively protect the forest and discourage the presence of armed militias has been 
executed. EU funds EUR 12 millions have played a central role in reinforcing DRC capacity to 
protect the Virunga forests and supplying solutions for local communities attracting other private 
and institutional donors.46
However, the final PPP between the ICCN and the NGO shifted the entire responsibility for 
the management of the park to the Virunga Foundation, and thus does not represent an 
institutional reform of the ICCN in Virunga.47 Despite this, the EC continued its ‘general’ 
discourse on contributing to institutional reform and capacity-building in the DRC, as the 
document above does not reveal that the EC does not directly support ICCN, but instead 
supports an NGO.
When looking more in detail at what this multi-sectoral approach entails in practice, it 
contains multiple actions contributing to the militarisation of the park management. First, 
it entails the creation of a ‘new security service’: 
it was the EU at the basis of the creation of this new security service, they facilitated the internal 
reform process and the start-up of a strict command and control structure. We now have a service 
for security and operations; where all intelligence comes together.48
The current head of security of Virunga is not employed by the ICCN, but by the Virunga 
Foundation, and is a former Belgian paramilitary who presents himself in meetings with the 
neighbouring communities as the commandant. Second, the EC financed additional para-
military training of park guards and provided communication equipment under the 
Instrument for Peace and Stability in 2009. Third, under the 10th European Development 
Fund (EDF) the EC donated 10 million euro, which covers around 80% of the day-to-day 
management costs, and is used to top up the salaries of the armed park guards with a US$165 
monthly prime, in addition to the US$60 salary from the government. Moreover, the guards 
also operate in mixed brigades with the Congolese army, the FARDC under the command 
and control, and with logistic support, of the park management.49 EC officials are aware that 
this might create controversy due to the controversial human rights reputation of the FARDC, 
but also because the financial regulations of the different development instruments and 
funds are rather strict about (para)military cooperation. Therefore, the EC avoids explicitly 
stating in public that development aid is used to pay the guards and their training; instead 
they frame their support in generic terms such as for building capacity. One EC official argued, 
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‘No, no, the salaries of the guards are not paid by the EU. We pay the ACF, but it is up to them 
how they spend the money’.50 Yet another official explained that the EC aid is indeed used 
to pay the guards, ‘but we call them “primes” and not salaries; we do this also in other parks, 
we play a bit with the ambiguity in the regulations’.51 Yet for some of the newly trained 
guards, already working for the park, the EC fee is de facto their salary as they are still waiting 
to receive salaries from Kinshasa.52 Hence, through the application of seemingly broad con-
cepts such as reinforcing capacities, and by only providing limited information, the EC man-
aged to finance military activities, while limiting the risk of controversy. These practices, and 
technically naming the financial support to the paramilitary guards ‘fees’, are examples of 
the mundane practices of securitisation that enable the EC to continue its support to the 
Virunga Foundation.
In addition to providing direct support for (para)military park management activities, the 
EC also contributed to the militarisation of the park through supporting various development 
projects that are based on a soft counter-insurgency approach to establish a form of ‘inclu-
sionary control’ over neighbouring communities.53 The EC describes this as ‘Fuelling stability: 
implementing multiple strategies for forest protection in a region of armed conflict’,54 which 
includes a focus on economic development and stimulating the ‘green economy’.55 This 
economic focus stems from the fact the EC understands both the protracted violence in the 
east of the DRC and park–people conflict in the Virunga area from an economic perspective. 
Based on ideas around ‘environmental security’, poverty and ‘greed’ are seen as the main 
drivers of these conflicts.56 To address these conflicts the EC heavily invested in the Virunga 
Alliance, a large-scale development vision for the Virunga area that is implemented by a 
consortium of public and private investors. Steered by the Virunga Foundation, and with 
the extensive support of Howard Buffet, a US multimillionaire, and the EC, the Virunga 
Alliance is planning to construct in total seven hydro-electricity plants around the borders 
of the park. A part of the generated electricity will be distributed to the adjacent population 
around the park, but the largest part will be sold to businesses and industries in the hope 
of generating jobs for the neighbouring population. It is believed that when these jobs are 
generated, people will become dependent on the park for their livelihoods, and therefore 
will want the park to survive. Moreover, according to the Virunga Alliance, this would stim-
ulate the neighbouring population to distance themselves from the armed groups that are 
present in the park.57 This security logic embedded in the development scheme of the park 
has a strong resonance with the EC: ‘we are for 100 percent behind this vision, and behind 
de Merode’.58 It was the EC that financed the first hydro-plant in Mutwanga as a pilot project 
for 1.8 million euro. Moreover, recently the EC decided to increase its aid to the Virunga 
Foundation from 10 million under the 10th EDF to 46.8 million to the 11th EDF. Of this, 15 
million will cover a large part of the daily management costs, 12 million will go to construct 
additional hydropower plants, 15 million is for agriculture and forestry ‘valorisation’ projects 
around the park, and 4 million is for the oversight and implementation costs of the different 
separate projects.
The interlinked objectives of improving both security and economic development are 
also reflected in the focus of the EC to support re-launching tourism in the Virunga park. 
This support arises out of two axes: ensuring the security of tourists and investing in infra-
structure. Under the first axis, guards were trained and their capacities reinforced to be able 
to assure the security of tourists visiting the park. For the second objective the EU invested 
in the tourist infrastructures around Rumangabo, so that tourists have access to water, 
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electricity and visas.59 These objectives were repeated in a press release in which the EC 
reconfirmed its support to Virunga:
Infrastructure reconstruction and increasing security in the Virunga National Park, together with 
a training programme for rangers and park managers, has supported the resumption of touristic 
activity in the eastern part of the DRC. Tourism in the Virunga Park has produced more than US$1 
million in revenues, and has already created job opportunities and boosted economic activity.60
Improving security is framed here by the EU as a necessary precondition for tourism, which 
will generate revenues for the park, and contribute to local development. As other scholars 
have also indicated, in some (post)conflict areas tourism promotion and other forms of 
marketisation simultaneously intensify, and are enabled by increasing, militarisation.61 Yet 
the increasing militarisation of the Virunga park fostered tensions between the adjacent 
population and park guards, and resulted in an upsurge of armed confrontations initiated 
by both groups.62 In the following section I analyse how these incidents of violence, focussing 
on the contentious issue of land conflicts surrounding the park, remain (or are rendered) 
invisible at the EC level. This ‘hiding’ is realised through various practices of securitisation, 
which is not always done intentionally, as some of these practices have been institutionalised 
to a certain extent.
The politics of (in)visibility surrounding Virunga’s land conflicts
Approximately 80,000 people are believed to live within the borders of the Virunga National 
Park, excluding the people that daily encroach on its borders to access their fields that are 
located in the park. Conflicts over the park’s limits have existed since the creation of the park 
in 1925 by the Belgian king Albert, during the colonial era. Initially the park compassed 
25,000 hectares but was incrementally extended to the current 790,000 hectares, a process 
that faced a lot of resentment as whole villages were removed under the pretext of the 
sleeping sickness, without receiving sufficient compensation.63 During the early days of the 
Mobutu regime, in the post-colonial era, the borders were respected mainly due to the strict 
policing approach of the park in those times.64 Yet, when the economy crippled from the 
mid-1970s onwards, guards of the park started to get involved in illegal activities in the park 
in order to generate a form of income, and the population recuperated parts of the park.65
Especially in 1994, and the two decades of violent conflict that followed, the park faced 
tremendous pressures as refugees arriving from Rwanda were installed in camps located 
close to the borders of the park. Moreover, different rebel groups hold control over different 
areas overlapping with parts of the Virunga park. These rebel groups influenced and some-
times replaced the public administration in their zone of control, and at multiple places they 
officially allowed people to settle in the park. From 2008 onwards the park authorities have 
aimed to re-establish the rule of law in and around the park, starting to engage in various 
military-style operations to place populations outside of the borders of the park, and destroy 
houses and farms.
First, it must be stressed that problems concerning the park are also caused by wider 
problems of governance and on-going violent conflict in the DRC. The park management 
cannot be held responsible for all the challenges that Virunga is facing. Yet this highly com-
plicated landscape makes it even more pertinent to take a conflict-sensitive approach to 
conservation, and it can be questioned to what extent this is currently the case, especially 
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vis-à-vis conflicts over the limits. According to an employee working for an international 
NGO in Goma, observing the conflict,
There are three different limits of the park; the ones according to the population, the legal 
boundaries as they are inscribed in the law and, third, the boundaries according to the park 
authorities, the ones they enforce. At some points these different limits overlap, but at other 
points they are conflicting.66
However, the park authorities refuse to sit around the table with the local customary chiefs 
in the area, as they are found to have no legitimacy. According to the director of the park, ‘I 
will continue fighting the Mwamis [local chiefs] they make claims to which they are not 
entitled to, according to the law and we [the park] is here to implement the rule of law’.67 
Instead, park authorities adopt a ‘top-down’ approach, which consists of announcing and 
enforcing the borders, clearing villages and farms, and protecting the control gained over 
territory through the rehabilitation of patrol posts and increasing surveillance and patrols 
by the guards. This process is not accompanied by an extensive campaign to communicate 
to and with the concerned population. These observations are shared not only by the adja-
cent population, but also by numerous local and international environmental NGOs working 
in the area.68
In the central sector of the park, where the conflicts over limits are most ferocious, patrols 
are conducted in collaboration with the FARDC. In multiple places where people have been 
removed, or farms destroyed, vicious circles of conflicts have emerged as people tried to 
return afterwards. Yet, to return, they increasingly solicit the protection of armed groups, 
self-defence groups or other groups in the area, which sometimes results in lethal confron-
tations between park guards and armed groups.69 The consequences for the guards are 
often devastating, and over the past two decades over 150 guards have lost their lives. The 
number has been sharply rising over the last few years, due to the intensified operations to 
retake control over territory. This creates growing resentment among the guards who reg-
ularly have to work at the ‘front line’.70 These confrontations also cause casualties among the 
civilian population; in 2013, for example two farmers were killed in Mayangoz during a patrol 
by two guards of the park. The guards were arrested and imprisoned, awaiting trial for over 
a year. The park authorities acknowledge that the guards at times make use of excessive 
force, but aim to reduce these incidents.71 This raises the question to what extent the EC is 
aware of the challenges and contestations over the approach the park management has 
adopted to restore its control over the park.
‘There are no conflicts!’
Despite much evidence to the contrary, according to an EC official contacted in Brussels, 
there are no conflicts over the limits of the park:
The limits of the park are clear; the local population only does not respect them. Around the 
Virunga park there are no conflicts over land, these local population are just manipulated and 
you should not talk too much with them because they will simply not tell you the truth, and 
will manipulate you as well.
By arguing that the land disputes are not conflicts, but that the population is just manipu-
lated, the EC takes away any agency from the adjacent population, proclaiming there to be 
only ‘one truth’. Yet, while EC representatives can claim that the borders are ‘clear’ from a legal 
perspective and that the Virunga Foundation has the legitimacy and right to reinforce the 
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borders, locally questions of legitimacy are not solely interpreted from a legalistic perspec-
tive, in light of the existing legal pluralism around access to and control over land in North 
Kivu, which has been aggravated by two decades of protracted conflict. Moreover, the EC 
neglects the historicity of the issue, which dates back to the colonial period when the park 
was created.72
During interviews, EC officials aimed to downplay the colonial past and were not receptive 
to critically reflecting on the more structural inequalities around the management of the 
park that remain unaddressed due to the extensive support from the EC to the transnation-
alisation of the park management. While locally it is seen as a continuation of the colonial 
past that a Belgian park director, with the support of Brussels, manages the park, during 
interviews the main EC official working on the park refuted this perspective as irrelevant. 
Instead, he argues that the current management aims to adhere to the rule of law and does 
the best it can due to the difficult circumstances, and therefore cannot be criticised.73 
Moreover, it was argued that the problems rest solely within ‘the state’ and the ‘criminal local 
population’. Many of the EC officials I spoke with became illusioned with the DRC government 
and argue that the problems of Virunga, and the DRC at large, ‘has to do with bad governance, 
incompetent state officials, corruption and no political will to solve the problems in the 
country and the park. They are basically all crooks’.74 The EC engages more often in ‘“functional 
pathologisation”, lending credence to the need for Western intervention by painting 
Congolese politics as malevolent’.75 Not only are the government authorities criminalised, 
but so too is a part of the population living in or around Virunga.
It is believed that only a small part of the adjacent population has a hostile position 
towards the park, and that they are solely motivated by economic reasons to encroach on 
its borders to produce charcoal or to cultivate plots of land. Moreover, labelling them ‘crim-
inals’ and their practices ‘illegal’ strengthens the understanding of the EC officials that rein-
forced law enforcement is an adequate solution. In addition to these measures, the EC aims 
to stimulate the ‘green economy’ to address these underlying ‘economic motivations’. This 
narrow (economic) understanding of poverty as the cause of park–people contestations 
marginalises the perspectives of the affected population. It also allows the EC to present its 
support to the park and stimulation of the green economy as an adequate ‘technical’ solution 
to the conflicts.76 This contributes to the depoliticisation of the contentious issue of land 
access related to Virunga.
Moreover, this singular focus on economic factors diverts attention away from the violence 
and land conflicts that have been intensified by the increasing militarisation of the park 
management, which has been supported by the EC. Once international organisations, such 
as the EC, make the decision to contribute to ‘green militarisation’ through development 
budgets, the range of involved individuals have a stake in ‘playing with visibility, deciding 
what to show’77 to ensure the continuation of the support. As Lombard argues, ‘Playing with 
visibility is a way to keep politics personalized – that is, to perpetuate the importance of the 
people involved in determining the outcomes rather than handing over those decision-mak-
ing powers to institutionalized rules or customs.’78  In the case of the support of the EC to 
the Virunga park these practices of hiding are examples of mundane securitising practices, 
facilitating the ‘green militarisation of development aid’.
The few EC policymakers aware of the everyday realities of conservation in conflict areas 
such as the north-east of the Central African Republic (CAR),  or the east of the DRC, act as 
gatekeepers in deciding what to show to people in the wider EU system who do not work 
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directly in these areas. Within DG DEVCO there is one desk officer who became a central 
figure concerning biodiversity protection in Central Africa, having arranged funding for 
multiple Protected Areas (PAs)  for over 30 years, including Virunga. He was the driving force 
20 years ago behind the creation of Réseau des aires protégées d’Afrique centrale (RAPAC), a 
regional body which has its seat in Gabon to implement the ECOFAC programmes and 
finance. He was recently named an honourable member of RAPAC, the appointment letter 
stated ‘You are the father, the ambassador, the protector and the defender of RAPAC, you 
were always there when the region needed support and allies’.79 To arrange and design 
support and projects for Virunga, this desk officer closely collaborated with one EC official 
at the EU delegation in Kinshasa for over 21 years in Central Africa. When information is 
needed about the park, other officials within the EU often rely on the respective desk officer, 
who systematically refused any internal promotions so as not to lose the strategic position 
he was in.80
For example, an EEAS official recalled how a DEVCO colleague reacted to a question 
concerning land conflicts in Virunga and wondered how many people lived within the bor-
ders of the park: ‘it was assured me that there were no such problems in Virunga, and because 
we change position every 4/5 years, we don’t become experts’.81 This in part also explains 
why the violence linked to the conservation practices remains remarkably hidden among 
the largest part of the EU institutions. Yet the politics of altering and framing information 
happen at multiple levels, also between the Virunga area and the EC delegation in Kinshasa 
and between the delegation and the headquarters of the EC in Brussels. As an example, 
many EC officials in Brussels were not aware that the first hydro-plant they financed produces 
substantially less electricity than planned, connecting fewer households, and that attracted 
agri-businesses also need to use generators to have enough electricity.82  This is remarkable 
as the EC decided to allocate an additional 12 million to the construction of hydro-plants. 
The limited availability of updated information is also caused by the difficulty to access most 
of the areas in the park. Therefore, donors, auditors and journalists often limit their visits to 
the park headquarters in Rumangabo, where they are skilfully presented a limited reality of 
life in and around Virunga.
Concluding remarks
Since 1988 the EC has been the main supporter of the Virunga National Park. While it is dif-
ficult to determine exactly how much of the development aid the EC provided has been 
used directly for military activities, it is safe to argue that the extensive EC support to the 
management of the park allowed the latter to adopt a militarised approach to conservation. 
By focussing on mundane practices of securitisation within the European Commission, and 
between the different European institutions, I demonstrate how it became regularised to 
use development funds for militarised conservation practices, whilst ‘normally’ the use of 
development aid for paramilitary purposes could generate political controversy and attract 
heightened scrutiny within the EU.
Yet in the case of Virunga, a personalised network within the EC renders it ‘invisible’ that 
development funds are actually used to finance armed conservation efforts. Through broad, 
and seemingly political neutral, descriptions within policy documents such as ‘capacity build-
ing’, the EC does not reveal much about the daily conservation practices that are financed 
with EC development aid. Moreover, the controversies around armed conservation efforts 
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in Virunga, and their effects, are also rendered invisible by policymakers often unintentionally. 
By framing contestations against the park as solely driven by economic logics, including the 
wider dynamics of protracted conflict in the east of the DRC, conservation-related conflicts 
are depoliticised. From this perspective the EC argues that its support to the stimulation of 
the ‘green economy’ is the ‘solution’ not only to protect the Virunga National Park, but also 
to bring ‘peace’ to the war-torn east of the DRC.
Moreover, in this article I argue that ‘green militarisation’ is enabled not only by the finan-
cial resources deployed to the salaries and training of the paramilitary park guards but also 
by the historical and personal relations between the Virunga Foundation and the EC. Because 
the EC has a long history of supporting the Virunga park, a small group of individuals was 
able to create a personalised network of governance around the management of the park, 
that provided the Virunga Foundation with sufficient political and financial support to imple-
ment its management strategy which consists of hard- and soft-counterinsurgency 
approaches to conservation. As a result, only a handful EC officials are deeply aware of the 
political sensitivity of the support of the EC to the park. By arguing that one should not listen 
to the ‘local population’, as ‘they will manipulate you’, authoritative knowledge claims are 
made with the aim to steer the knowledge production of the Virunga area in such a way to 
increase donor support to the park, instead of questioning the actual effects of the green 
militarisation of development aid. Through these practices of mundane securitisation, pol-
icymakers within the EC are able to circumvent political debate about the use of development 
funds for recurrent (para)military expenditures, allowing them to ‘play’ with the ambiguity 
in the financial regulation to pay the ‘fees’ of the armed park guards.
This is arguably less likely to occur in places that are not tainted by conflict and/or political 
crises, and points at a mode of ‘crisis conservation’ advanced by the European Commission, 
entailing coinciding processes of transnationalisation of management structures and its 
‘green militarisation’. To get a fuller picture of how ‘crisis conservation’ works, additional 
multi-level research is needed to analyse how the related discourses and practices are appro-
priated and contested by those involved in more local levels of these transnational govern-
ance complexes. Examples include state authorities, park guards, development workers, 
local authorities and inhabitants of the park area. It is only by exploring the agency of all 
layers of the crisis conservation complex that we expose their internal contradictions and 
their effects.
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